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SUPPORT RIGHTS AND AN OUT-OF-STATE DIVORCE
MONRAD G. PAULSEN*
Whom God hath joined together are sometimes put asunder by
a legal proceeding which accomplishes only part of the job. On the
surface of things the dissolution of a marriage would not only re-
store the capacity to remarry but also would alter the property rights
and the rights to support which stem from the marriage relation-
ship. Yet certain divorce decrees which do restore the privilege of
remarrying fail to destroy a husband's duty to support his ex-wife
as if she were still his spouse in every respect. The result, the
Supreme Court of the United States has said, is to make divorce
"divisible."' The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the
problems arising when claims rooted in the marriage status are
asserted after an out-of-state divorce valid so far as remarriage is
concerned.
A PRE-EXISTING SUPPORT ORDER AND A FOREIGN
Ex PARTE DECREE
A decree of limited divorce or separate maintenance which,
among other things, provides for the making of support payments to
the wife often is the first legal step in a disintegrating marriage.2
The final step, absolute divorce, normally cuts off the obligation to
to make payments under a separate maintenance decree. However,
this result does not always follow if the decree of absolute divorce
was granted ex parte. Particularly, is this true if the ex parte di-
vorce decree was granted in a state other than the state which im-
posed the order of support.:'
*A.B. 1940, University of Chicago; J.D. 1942, University of Chicago.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 549 (1948). See Bingham, The
American, Law Institute v. The Supreme Court, 21 Corn. L. Q. 393 esp. at 421
(1936) ; Powel, And Repent at Leisure, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 930, 953 (1945);
Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1951).
2. Orders requiring a payment to a wife may be found in (1) a decree
of limited divorce, (2) a decree of separate maintenance or (3) some special
statutory proceeding which does not fit neatly in categories (1) and (2). For
the purpose of this article the distinction will be ignored save as the text refers
to the provisions of particular statutes. The terms "support order" and "sepa-
rate maintenance decree" are used interchangeably to refer to the orders in
all of these categories.
3. There is a question whether a state may continue to enforce its sup-
port order after a foreign ex parte decree but to terminate it after a local
ex parte divorce. The full faith and credit statute merely requires F2 to give
the same credit as F' would give its decree but does not, in terms, forbid
treating the F' decree less favorably than a similar one of F2. Discrimination
of this sort is perhaps forbidden by the full faith and credit constitutional
provision of its own force or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or by the privileges and immunities of Article IV, § 2 of the
Constitution. See forris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287, 1299
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Whether a foreign ex parte divorce decree terminates an existing
order for support first raises a conflict of laws question under the
law of the state in which the order was entered. Some courts cut
off support orders after a foreign ex parte decree ;4 others, taking
the position that a wife's rights under such a decree are in personam,
refuse to do so because the divorcing court lacks personal jurisdic-
tion over the absent wife. 5 The latter view creates a full faith and
credit problem in the states which embrace it provided the divorcing
state would cut off a support order by its own ex parte decree.
Nevada judicial proceedings are entitled to no greater effect in New
York than in Nevada." This full faith and credit question was an-
swered by the Supreme Court of the United States in its 1948 Estiz
decision.7
Mr. Estin and his wife lived together in New York until 1942.
In 1943, Mrs. Estin was granted a decree of separation and $180
per month as permanent alimony in a proceeding in which Mr. Estin
had entered a general appearance. In January, 1944, Mr. Estin
went to Nevada and in May, 1945, a Nevada court, having found
that Mr. Estin had been a bona fide resident of Nevada since Janu-
ary, 1944, granted him an ex parte divorce.
After the entry of the Nevada divorce decree Mr. Estin ceased
paying installments falling due under the terms of the New York
separation decree. Mrs. Estin brought an action in the New York
courts asking for accrued alimony. Her husband appeared and, con-
tending that his duty to support her was terminated by the Nevada
divorce, moved to strike out the alimony provisions of the separa-
tion decree. This motion was denied by the courts of the State of
New York even though Mr. Estin was admitted to be a bona fide
(1951) ; Note, 27 N. C. L. Rev. 134, 139 (1949) (equal protection) ; Casey
and MacChesney, Divorces by the Consent of the Parties and Divisible
Divorce Decrees, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 608, 619-620 (1948) (privileges and im-
munities) ; Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S.
541, 549-550 (1948) (full faith and credit).
4. E.g., Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Cal. 2d 762, 68 P. 2d 351 (1937);
State v. Lynch, 42 Del. 95, 28 A. 2d 163 (1942) ; McCullough v. McCullough,
203 Mich. 288, 168 N. W. 929 (1918) semble. The cases are collected in Note,
1 A. L. R. 2d 1385 (1948) and Note, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1346 (1953).
5. E.g., Durlacher v. Durlacher, 123 F. 2d 70 (9th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U. S. 805 (1942) ; Simonton v. Simonton, 40 Idaho 751, 236 Pac.
863 (1925); Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262 (1925). The
cases are collected in Note, 1 A. L. R. 2d 1385 (1948) and Note, 28 A. L. R.
2d 1346 (1953).
6. "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... shall have the same
full faith and credit . . . as they have by law or usage in the court of such
state ... from which they are taken." 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (Supp. 1952). Cf.
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610 (1947).
7. Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (1948). The case is discussed in Paulsen,
Migratory Divorce: Chapters III and IV, 24 Ind. L. J. 25, 46-55 (1948).
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domiciliary of Nevada.8 On certiorari, the New York courts were
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion distinguished between
different aspects of the marriage relationship. However exacting the
requirements of full faith and credit may be, they do not demand
that when the state of the domicil of only one spouse enters a decree
that thereby all legal incidents of marriage are terminated in every
state. The state of either party's domicil may grant a divorce entitled
to full faith and credit as to questions of marital status and legiti-
macy. Yet on the matter of support the state in which the abandoned
spouse is domiciled has an important interest which that state may
protect.0
Furthermore while Nevada divorces may well put an end to a
Nevada support order, the New York alimony decree was granted
by a court having personal jurisdiction over the parties. The ali-
mony decree is a property interest of Mrs. Estin which cannot be
taken from her by a court which does not have jurisdiction over her
person. Nevada was without power to terminate Mrs. Estin's rights
in the New York decree.
The issue in Estin was whether New York could continue to en-
force its order for support payments after a valid ex parte divorce.
The question remained whether, after Estin, states would and could
terminate the support decree.
Soon after the 1948 Supreme Court case courts in Pennsyl-
vania10 and Oregon"' granted motions to strike from decrees of
separate maintenance the provision requiring the husband involved
to pay support money. The Pennsylvania opinion merely announces,
".i. t is well settled in this Commonwealth that a valid divorce
decree terminates the duty of a husband to support his wife because
of the severance of the marital relationship .. ."12 The Oregon
8. Estin v. Estin, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 476 (1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 829,
66 N. Y. S. 2d 421 (2d Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E. 2d 113
(1947).
9. This point of view in Estin had been expressed by Mr. justice
Douglas previously. "I think it is important to keep in mind a basic difference
between the problem of marital capacity and the problem of support... In
other words, it is not apparent that the spouse who obtained the decree can
defeat an action for maintenance or support in another State by showing that
he was domiciled in the State which awarded him the divorce decree.... But
I am not convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal service
the decree need by given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance
or support of the other spouse or children." Justice Douglas in Esenwein v.
Esenwein, 325 U. S. 279, 281-282 (1945) (concurring opinion).
10. Commonwealth ex tel. McCormack v. McCormack, 164 Pa. Super
553, 67 A. 2d 603 (1949).
11. Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore. 140, 200 P. 2d 616 (1948).
12. Commonwealth ex tel. McCormack v. McCormack, 164 Pa. Super
553, 554, 67 A. 2d 603, 604 (1949).
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opinion of Rodda v. Rodda agrees that the marriage relation con-
stitutes the foundation of the support order and therefore when the
marriage is destroyed "the order has lost all vitality."'13 But there
the position is made to depend not upon the nature of things but
upon a readihg of the Oregon statute providing for decrees of sep-
aration. The statute speaks of the separation of "married persons";
it provides for vacating the decree if the cause for separation no
longer exists.14 To the Oregon Supreme Court the legislative
scheme was designed for a situation in which the man and woman
were living separately but were nevertheless bound in marriage for
all other purposes. If the relationship was destroyed for other pur-
poses, the separation decree with its attendant support order was
terminated.
A Massachusetts case, Jelly v. Jelly," in like manner rests upon
peculiar statutory language. There the order in question was a
support order 6 entered against a husband upon a showing that he
had failed, without justifiable cause, to provide suitable support for
his wife. Under Massachusetts law the order could be made even if
the wife was still living with her husband and performing some of
the duties of a wifey.7 The decree was "designed for the protection
of the wife while she remained in the status of a married woman."'
It has been suggested that a result like that reached in Rodda v.
Rodda violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The argument runs: (a) the separate maintenance decree is
a property of the wife in whose favor it was. imposed, (b) property
rights cannot be taken away without personal service over the per-
son who owns them, (c) therefore the decree can be taken away only
by a court having in personam jurisdiction over the wife.' 9 This
position is scarcely tenable. It depends upon the assertion that the
wife has a "property" right and upon the hope that the meaning of
that term will not be examined. In Oregon, the interest a wife has
13. Rodda v. Rodda, 175 Ore. 140, 150, 200 P. 2d 616, 621 (1948) ; noted
34 Iowa L. Rev. 705 (1949).
14. Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. § 63-215 (Supp. 1943).
15. Jelly v. Jelly, 327 Mass. 706, 100 N. E. 2d 365 (1951).
16. The order was entered pursuant to Mass. Ann. Laws c. 209 § 32
(Supp. 1953).
17. Buckman v. Buckman, 176 Mass. 229, 57 N. E. 343 (1900).
18. Barney v. Tourtellotte, 138 Mass. 106, 108 (1884).
19. See, for example, Comment, Enforcement of Prior Support Order
Following Ex Parte Foreign Divorce, in Selected Essays on Family Law 1109,
1112 (1950) : "A court having jurisdiction over the parties would not infringe
due process by discontinuing an order for support on grounds of the hus-
band's inability to pay, a changed set of conditions whereby the wife no longer
needs financial aid, or other mitigating circumstances. But to terminate such
an order solely on the basis of an ex parte foreign divorce seems clearly
unconstitutional." This point was raised but expressly not decided in Pope v.
Pope, 117 N. E. 2d 65, 66 (I1. 1954).
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under a support order is exactly what the Oregon law says the in-
terest is. If the Oregon law provides that such an interest lasts only
so long as the entire marriage relationship continues and that the
interest terminates whenever the parties are divorced in any sense
then the constitutional rights of the wife are not violated by the
termination of the decree after a valid ex parte divorce. The law
creating her interest provides for the expiration of her rights.2 0 The
choice between the approaches of Estin and Rodda respectively is
a problem of legislative wisdom and legislative policy and not of
constitutional law.
Although supporting cases are found in other states, 21 New
York's Estin position finds its most elaborately reasoned support
in the dissent of Rodda v. Rodda.22 The dissenting judges in two
separate opinions point out that public policy is opposed to those
who shirk the duty imposed by support orders. Mrs. Rodda was
described as broken in health and in need of funds for support.
"That one of its citizens may be placed in such a situation by the
ex parte decree of a sister state is a matter of vital concern to the
State of Oregon, and that concern should be a sufficient reason in
law to justify its courts in maintaining the integrity of the prior
Oregon decree."2 3 To cut off the separate maintenance payments is
to give the ex parte Nevada divorce the effect of an in personam
decree. Husbands can run away from their obligations simply by
moving to a new state and getting an ex parte divorce.
The Oregon dissents resolve the difficulties raised by the
statute's use of language referring to "husband" and "wife" and to
"married persons" by interpreting the words as merely descriptive
of those persons who are appropriate parties to the support order
proceeding.24 Whether the order should be terminated after an ex
20. This analysis is supported in Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L.
Rev. 1287, 1295-1296 (1951).
21. Pope v. Pope, 117 N. E. 2d 65 (Ill. 1954); Brown v. Brown, 19
N. J. Super 431, 88 A. 2d 650 (1952). In Rice v. Rice, 213 Ark. 981, 214
S. W. 2d 235 (1948) the Arkansas Supreme Court enforced payments due
under a New York maintenance decree after the date of a valid ex parte
Arkansas divorce. The court proceeded on the theory that the Arkansas
divorce did not purport to affect the wife's property rights. See also
Kruvand v. Kruvand, 59 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1952). A separate maintenance
decree may survive because the husband is estopped to attack it even though
an attack would be successful. Johnson v. Johnson, 119 Colo. 551, 206 P. 2d
597 (1949).
22. 185 Ore. 140, 162-210, 200 P. 2d 616, 626-644 (1948).
23. Id. at 177, 200 P. 2d at 632.
24. Id. at 175, 200 P. 2d at 631. The Oregon statute provides: "A perma-
nent separation of married persons from bed and board may be decreed ... "
Ore. Laws 1941 c. 408 § 1. The New York statute in question in Estin pro-
vides: "Where an action for separation from bed and board is brought by
the wife... ." N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1164.
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parte divorce is certainly a question not dearly answered by the use
of those terms. 'Vhen the statute was passed an ex parte decree
granted by a state other than the state of the matrimonial domicil
was not entitled to full faith and credit.25 Therefore, before Williams
I the support order would have survived the typical ex parte migra-
tory divorce decree. Without any great difficulty the courts can con-
tinue to enforce the support order under the statute in accordance
with the pre-Williams I law save only in cases where the full faith
and credit clause requires a different result.26 Estin v. Estin makes
it clear that the full faith and credit clause does not require the
termination of a support order after an ex parte foreign divorce.
The statutory language providing for separate maintenance in
Illinois has been read to permit the survival of an Illinois mainten-
ance decree.27 The phrase, "married men or women," the terms
"husbands" and "wives" in the statute were not insuperable ob-
stacles to the survival of a decree after a foreign divorce. The statute
was read in the light of the state's ".... special concern.., in secur-
ing support for the wife ... manifested in other statutes and...
decisions intended to enforce the husbands' obligation."' The Illi-
nois court hesitated ". . . to read into this act a requirement so hostile
to its general purpose."2 9 The opinion spells out an understanding
that the incidents of marriage can be separated if sound policy re-
quires it. This understanding comes easily in Illinois because in that
state an ex parte divorce does not impair a wife's homestead rights.
3
0
25. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906) which supposedly was
overruled in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
26. "It is true that the Nevada decree has given to Dr. Rodda the status
of an unmarried man to the extent that he may lawfully contract a second
marriage, but I am of the opinion that sufficient of the doctrines of Haddock
v. Haddock remains to permit the Oregon court to refuse recognition to that
decree as terminating the decree of separate maintenance. Distinguished
legal scholars have not hesitated to say that the divorced wife, in such a
situation, may be regarded by the state of her domicil, for the purpose of re-
ceiving separate maintenance under the previous decree, as if she were still
'the wife'." Id. at 172-173, 200 P. 2d at 630.
27. Pope v. Pope, 117 N. E. 2d 65 (11. 1954).
28. Id. at 67.
29. Id. at 68.
30. Ibid. Courts have usually measured the effect of a divorce on interest
in land by the law of the place where the land is rather than looking to the
law of the divorcing state. E.g., Ross v. Ross, 79 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Cal.
1948); Eberle v. Simonek, 24 N. J. Super. 366, 94 A. 2d 535 (1953). In
Epstein v. Epstein, 193 Md. 164, 66 A. 2d 381 (1948), it was hinted that a
foreign ex parte divorce would not destroy a Maryland tenancy by the en-
tireties: "Maryland is the sole mistress of the devolution of Maryland land.
• . . No judgment or decree except a judgment or decree of a Maryland
Court, state or federal, can operate upon title to or possession of, Maryland
land." Id. at 175, 66 A. 2d at 385. However, in Millar v. Millar, 200 Md. 14,
87 A. 2d 838 (1952), the court held that a valid ex parte decree destroyed
the marriage and hence under Maryland law the tenancy was servered.
(Vol. 38:709
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The New York Estin result is generally supported by commenta-
tors in discussions of the policy question presented by the case.31
Almost none would permit a husband to move away from his re-
sponsibilities. To permit ex parte divorces may be necessary in fair-
ness to those persons who are married to out-of-state spouses and
who wish to be divorced. On the other hand fairness to the out-of-
state spouse requires that separate maintenance provisions not be
terminated without personal jurisdiction. Otherwise a wife may be
required to make a costly appearance far from home to protect her
only source of income. Of course, flexibility is desirable in any long
range provision for support payments. Sensible flexibility, however,
is not achieved by a mechanical rule which destroys a support order
automatically at the moment the parties regain the capacity to re-
marry. The objective is best attained in other ways. Under Estin
the husband may still apply to the New York courts for a reduction
in the sum to be paid upon the showing of changed circumstances.
In Georgia a provision for temporary alimony failed to survive
an ex parte Texas decree. 3 2 The Georgia court relying on the Estin
case understood that the full faith and credit clause did not require
that the Georgia order be cut off by the Texas divorce. However,
in Georgia temporary alimony is granted only for the wife's support
during the pendency of suit for a divorce or permanent alimony.
The court held that because the Texas courts had already divorced
the couple a Georgia divorce or order for permanent alimony could
not be granted and therefore no basis existed for the temporary
alimony decree. Certainly if there is no possibility of permanent ali-
mony in Georgia after an ex parte foreign decree the result seems
fair enough. But if Georgia were a state which would permit a suit
for alimony after the divorce the outcome of this case would make
little sense. A woman who is entitled to alimony ought to receive
support for the period during which she seeks to establish her right.
In short whether a decree for temporary alimony survives should
depend upon the possibility of getting alimony for the first time after
a valid cx parte decree, a subject to which we shall turn later.33
In California the alimony provisions of the interlocutory decree
31. Comment, Enforcement of Prior Support Order Following Ex
Parte Foreign Divorce, in Selected Essays in Family Law 1109, 1114-1116
(1950) ; Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287, 1302-1303 (1951) ;
Paulsen, Migratory Divorce, 24 Ind. L. J. 25, 51-52 (1948) ; Note, 48 Col.
L. Rev. 1083, 1090 (1948) ; 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1454 (1948) ; 16 U. Chi. L. Rev.
151 (1948). Some of the cases following Estin and commented upon in this
article are discussed in Rames, Divisible Divorce and Subtractable Support,
6 WVyo. L. J. 277 (1952).
32. Meeks v. Meeks, 209 Ga. 588, 74 S. E. 2d 861 (1953).
33. See pp. 722-729 infra.
INNESOTA LAW REVIEW
are the final adjudication of support rights and not affected by the
entry of the final decree 3 4 A foreign ex parte divorce obtained after
the interlocutory but before the final decree in no way changes the
obligations of the husband under the former.35
The Estin case has been limited in New York to situations in
which the husband was the plaintiff in the cx parte divorce. In
MacKay v. MacKay,86 the Appellate Division in New York held
that the rights under a separate maintenance decree were destroyed
when the wife obtained the Reno divorce. The decision is of a
divided court. Two of the five judges make the argument, curious
in the light of Estin, that because the wife was estopped to attack
the divorce decree the marriage was dissolved and that, therefore,
the support order was destroyed.3 7 In the eyes of the concurring
judge, the wife is estopped from getting further benefit under the
order but he objects to statements by his brothers which root the
right to support in an existing marriage relationship.3
The two dissenting justices would apply Estin to the case with-
out regard to the wife's position as plaintiff in the ex parte pro-
ceeding.3 9 The estoppel principle has no application because the
husband has not acted in reliance upon the wife's conduct and, more
importantly, the right asserted is not merely a private right but one
upholding a New York maintenance order, "in which the State has
a vital interest." 40 The dissenters list several affirmative reasons
which argue for the survival of the maintenance decree. The Nevada
divorce court had no jurisdiction over the husband and hence was
unable to make any provisions respecting support. The State of
New York has an interest in securing support payment for a domi-
ciliary who is the divorced wife of a domiciliary. The present case
and Estin, taken together, present an anomaly: a supposedly guilty
wife is treated more favorably than one supposedly innocent.41
Like the Oregon rule concerning survival of support order, the
34. Wilson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 458, 189 P. 2d 266 (1948).
35. Campbell v. Campbell, 107 Cal. App. 2d 732, 328 P. 2d 81 (1951).
36. 279 App. Div. 350, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 82 (1st Dept 1952), noted in 27
N. Y. U. L. 513 (1952) ; 26 St. Johns L. Rev. 346 (1952).
37. Id. at 353, 110 N. Y. S. 2d at 85.
38. Id. at 355-356, 110 N. Y. S. 2d at 88.
39. Id. at 358. 110 N. Y. S. 2d at 90.
40. Id. at 360, 110 N. Y. S. 2d at 92.
41. '" .. we shall have the anomalous result that in a case where the hus-
band resorts to a foreign court and secures a divorce on constructive service
against a nonappearing wife (presumably for her fault), an earlier separa-
tion decree in the wife's favor providing for her support survives to protect
the wife's rights to alimony, whereas in the case of a wife who resorts to a
foreign state to secure a divorce in a like manner (presumably for the fault
of the husband), we deprive her of similar protection and leave her without
effective provision for her maintenance." Id. at 361, 110 N. Y. S. 2d at 93.
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application of the estoppel principle suffers from the vice of in-
flexibility. It apparently would deny the continued protection of a
support order to any wife who was a successful plaintiff in an ex
parte divorce. A woman may have sound reasons for wanting a
divorce and yet have real need for support as well as a strong moral
claim for its continuation.4 2 The fact of a wife's divorce may well
be one circumstance which a court would consider in modifying or
terminating a support order but other factors may indicate that the
original order should survive.
Separate maintenance decrees which survive are, of course, en-
titled to full faith and credit. Therefore, it should be quite clear that
if a support decree survives an ex parte foreign divorce by the law
of the state in which it is rendered it must be given credit every-
where. The effect given the order should be determined by the law
of the state from which it is taken not by the law of the forum. The
survival of a New Jersey separate maintenance decree depends up-
on the New Jersey conflicts law dealing with the effect of ex parte
Nevada decrees even when the problem is raised in a California
forum.4 3 It make no difference that the California law respecting the
survival of its support orders differs sharply from that of New
Jersey."1
SUPPORT RIGHTS AND AN IN PERSONAM 45 DIVORCE DECREE
If both parties to a marriage are before the divorcing court a
spouse may not later contest the jurisdictional basis of the decree
provided the divorcing state does not permit such an attack.4 6 Are
42. "A former wife in the position of plaintiff may have a just claim to
support from her husband upon dissolution of the marriage. By the marriage
he assumed the obligation of supporting his wife, and he should not be
allowed to escape that obligation by conduct which compels her to divorce
him. The wife is entitled to her day in court, to have a court of equity pass
on the merits of her claim that her former husband should support her."
Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal. 2d 516, 540, 254 P. 2d 528, 541 (1953) (judge Tray-
nor dissenting). The recent case, Pope v. Pope, 117 N. E. 2d 65 (Ill. 1954),
leaves the way open for the MAacKay doctrine in Illinois. In its opinion hold-
ing that an Illinois support order survives an ex parte divorce the court at
p. 67 said, "We... put to one side those cases in which divorce was obtained
at the instance of the wife."
43. Worthley v. Worthley, 267 P. 2d 23 (Cal. App. 1954) ; Summers v.
Summers, 69 Nev. 83, 241 P. 2d 1097 (1952). Cf. Rice v. Rice, 213 Ark. 981,
214 S. W. 2d 235 (1948) ; Kruvand v. Kruvand, 59 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1952).
44. The Nevada court correctly required the payment of sums due under
a surviving New York support order although in Nevada local support orders
do not survive a valid divorce. Summers v. Summers, 69 Nev. 83, 241 P. 2d
1097 (1952).
45. The term "in personam divorce" is used throughout this paper to
refer to a divorce granted by a court having personal jurisdiction over both
parties.
46. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S.
378 (1948). See Paulsen, Migratory Divorce: Chapter III and IV, 24 Ind.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
appearing parties bound in like fashion on the question of alimony?
The answer depends upon the conflict of laws rules of the states as
well as the requirements of full faith and credit.
The full faith and credit provisions of federal law direct F2 to
take a backward glance. F2 must give a divorce decree the "same
full faith and credit" as the courts of F1 would do. Further F 2 may,
within limits, give the F1 decree an effect in F2 greater than that re-
required by the federal mandate.4 7
One can be reasonably certain that an alimony decree granted in
F will, by force of the full faith and credit clause, be conclusive of
alimony or support claims in any other state provided (1) both
parties are before the F 1 court and (2) the F1 decree bars further
claims under the FPlaw. In such circumstances a wife may not en-
force a pre-existing support order nor may she get a later alimony
decree in another state. In Bates v. Bodie,4s a wife was granted
alimony by the courts of Nebraska after an Arkansas court with
personal jurisdiction over her had, awarded an amount "in full of
alimony and all other demands." The Supreme Court held that the
Nebraska award violated full faith and credit even though the
Nebraska award was to be made wholly out of Nebraska land.
Sometimes the command of the full faith and credit statute that
F2 must look to the law of F 1 is disregarded. For example in Isser-
man v. Isserman4 9 the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the
question of whether its separate maintenance decree survived an in
personam Nevada decree of divorce. In its opinion the court said:
"As to the effect of the Nevada decree on the existing decree of
the Court of Chancery for maintenance, we reaffirm what we
said in the previous appeal in the case, 2 N.J. 1, at page 7, . . .
that 'it is difficult to understand by what right the Nevada court
undertook to incorporate within its decree a paragraph declaring
null and void a decree of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey.'
... it is for the courts of our State and not those of Nevada to
say what effect the Nevada judgment has on existing litigation
or orders of the courts of this state."5
L. J. 25 (1948); Paulsen, Divorce Jurisdiction by Consent of the Parties-
Developments Since "Sherrer v. Sherrer", 26 Ind. L. J. 380 (1951).
47. That there are limits to the effect which F2 may give the judicial
acts of F1 is a topic not fully explored. It is doubtful whether F2 could not
treat an Fl separate maintenance decree as an absolute divorce in F2 yet in
some sense F2 would merely be giving "greater" effect to the F1 decree than
is required. Due process, equal protection, or possibly some other constitutional
provision would surely forbid a radical departure in F" from the purported
F" effect of judicial action.
48. 245 U. S. 520 (1918).
49. 11 N. J. 106, 93 A. 2d 571 (1952).
50. Id. at 114, 93 A. 2d at 574.
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Of course, the question is not one of New Jersey nor of Nevada but
of federal law. Under the full faith and credit statute the New
Jersey decree would be terminated because the Nevada effect of a
divorce is to terminate separate maintenance decrees.
The New Jersey court in Isserman did not commit error in spite
of the misconception because the New Jersey support order was, in
fact, terminated. The wife was said to have had a right to choose:
. . between relying on her maintenance decree in this State
and her cause of action for divorce for desertion with its in-
cidental right of alimony, or contesting her husband's action for
divorce in all particulars before the Nevada court. Having done
so and the decision having gone against her on the merits both
as to the right of her husband to a divorce and her right to
alimony, she placed herself in a position where her existing de-
cree of maintenance ceases to have any res adjudicata effect with
respect to her husband's duty for support." 51
However, the opinion did indicate that the New Jersey support
order might survive if the wife, even though personally before the
divorcing court, had not applied for alimony.
".. .where there is a failure to apply in the divorce proceeding
for alimony in substitution for the support order granted in the
maintenance proceeding, this is merely a procedural defect and
the decree of divorce alone does not merge or vacate a prior
order for separate maintenance."'5 2
Surely this statement is correct only if Nevada would permit the
maintenance decree to survive an in personam divorce.
In agreement with the suggestion from Issernun, the Ohio
courts have held in pre-Estin opinions that a foreign divorce pro-
ceeding in which both spouses were parties is not res judicata on
questions of support if the foreign court did not purport to decide
the question of support but merely the matter of marital status.53
On the other hand, the correct approach to the full faith and
credit question was employed in Lynn v. Lynn, 4 a New York case
decided after Estin.
"In the present case, however, the Nevada court had juris-
diction of the wife's person by reason of her appearance and,
consequently, it did have power to determine her right to ali-
mony. If that tribunal had expressly passed upon the matter of
51. Id. at 115, 93 A. 2d at 575 (the first set of italics has been added).
52. Id. at 114, 93 A. 2d at 575. This portion of the Isserinan opinion is
the principal subject of a casenote, 28 Notre Dame Law. 403 (1953).
53. Metzger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 202, 167 N. E. 690 (1929);
Manney v. Manney, 42 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 59 N. E. 2d 755 (1944).
54. 302 N. Y. 193, 97 N. E. 2d 748 (1951). It is interesting to note that
the New York Court of Appeals has held that a separation agreement will
survive an in personam divorce which makes no mention of the agreement.
Hettich v. Hettich, 304 N. Y. 8, 105 N. E. 2d 601 (1952).
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alimony and had either denied an allowance to the wife or award-
ed her a sum less than that fixed in the New York judgment,
there would be no doubt that the Nevada decree would be con-
trolling over the inconsistent provision of the New York judg-
ment. Since that would be the effect given in Nevada to such a
judgment when rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
wife's person ... "
"Controlling effect must likewise be given to the Nevada
decree in this case insofar as the matter of alimony is concerned,
even though it makes no provision for alimony and even though
the wife made no claim for any support in the action."'
The Nevada law seemed to cut off a prior support order and
also to forbid the granting of alimony after a divorce unless the
Nevada decree contained a reservation of jurisdiction; therefore,
the Lynn opinion refused to enforce the New York decree in favor
of Mrs. Lynn.
The Lynn opinion gives an effect to the Nevada decree which
probably goes beyond the demands of full faith and credit. The de-
cree in question contains certain recitals which could serve as a
basis for concluding that the Nevada court impliedly reserved juris-
diction to adjudicate the question of alimony at some future time.
If that conclusion were sound then New York could also decide the
matter of support. Full faith and credit does not require New York
to go beyond Nevada in the conclusiveness of the Nevada divorce.
The Lynn opinion disposes of this matter with the following:
"At any rate, a reservation of jurisdiction, if one there was,
neither keeps alive the alimony provisions of the New York
separation decree nor furnishes basis for inferring that the
Nevada court intended to leave the matter of support for de-
cision by the court of some other jurisdiction."5 6
This would seem to follow only as a matter of New York con-
flict of laws rules and not by force of federal law.
In short, whether a support order or getting of alimony survives
foreign in personam divorce will depend on the law of the divorcing
state so far as full faith and credit is concerned.57 If in the divorcing
state the decree cuts off all possibility of future maintenance and
alimony, the decree will have that effect universally; on the contrary
if the decree does not effect support rights under the F 1 law, federal
law permits their recognition elsewhere leaving the question to each
55. Id. at 202-203, 97 N. E. 2d at 752.
56. Id. at 204, 97 N. E. 2d at 753.
57. It should be said that every issue which could have been litigated
between parties is not concluded between them after they have met in a single
action. The res judicata effect of any proceeding will depend upon which
issues were before the court expressly or by implication. Freeman, Judg-
ments § 674-675 (5th ed. 1925).
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state's conflict of laws. The Kentucky opinion, Cooper v. Cooper,53
serves as an instructive example. There a wife was granted alimony
after an in personam Florida divorce but the Kentucky court under-
stood that the Florida court themselves did, in some cases, grant
alimony after a divorce. "Full faith and credit demands do not re-
quire that we give greater effect to the Florida decree, and matters
determined thereby, than given it in Florida." 9 The Kentucky
Supreme Court saw no reason under Kentucky conflicts rules to
bar the alimony award.
"The position and conduct of the respective parties has been
consistent throughout. The appellee has sought to obtain a
divorce in Florida and resist the imposition of alimony in Ken-
tucky; the appellant has sought to obtain permanent alimony in
Kentucky and resist the divorce in Florida. Both parties looked
to the forum of the Florida courts to adjudicate in regard to the
marital res exclusively, and looked to the forum of our own
courts to adjudicate in regard to rights in and to property within
this State and to the question of alimony. The parties were
capable to choose between equally competent tribunals. Having
done so, and persisted in the choice, their substantial rights will
not go in accordance with the weight of court dockets, but by the
laws of the chosen forums. ' 0
The force of local law may terminate rights to support even
though the foreign decree does not purport to do so. Suppose a
Florida in personam decree contains a provision that nothing in
the decree shall relieve the husband from the support provisions
of another state's prior order. The Maryland Court of Appeals
terminated a Maryland separate maintenance order after a Florida
decree which contained this sort of reservation."' The question the
court said was "whether, under Maryland law, the Maryland court
is authorized to exercise jurisdiction, by changing or by enforcing,
with or without change, the allowances in the decree .... ,, 62 The
answer given was, no. The marriage was destroyed by the Florida
decree and therefore no base remained upon which to rest the de-
cree of separate maintenance. The Appellate Division in New York
with two judges dissenting refused to enforce a New York separate
maintenance decree after an in personam Florida decree which
ordered the husband to pay the wife "in accordance with the terms"
58. 314 Ky. 413, 234 S. IV. 2d 658 (1950), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 876(1953).
59. Id. at 417, 234 S. W. 2d at 660.
60. Id. at 418. 234 S. W. 2d at 661.
61. Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Md. 329, 86 A. 2d 520 (1952) ; Johnson v.
Johnson, 97 A. 2d 330 (Aid. 1953).
62. Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Md. 329, 338, 86 A. 2d 520, 524 (1952).
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of the New York decree. 63 To the majority the Florida decree was
"the new source of the.., obligation of the husband." 64 The upshot
of this decision is to deprive a wife of the immediate New York
remedies of enforcement and to leave her with the problem of en-
forcing the Florida decree by starting a new proceeding on the
basis of it.
Assuming the court has personal jurisdiction over both parties
it is probably the wisest course for a state to require their property
and alimony problems to be resolved by the court which divorces
them. The interests of both parties are protected if they are af-
forded their "day in court"-a full opportunity to urge their re-
spective positions. Many of the issues in the divorce action will be
relevant on the question of alimony. The trend of the best thinking
on questions concerning the conduct of litigation is to force parties
to state related claims in one proceeding.
However wise this proposition may be for the family law of the
divorcing state, a second state should not automatically cut off sup-
port rights which remain untouched by the law of the state of the
divorce, merely because both parties appeared before the courts
in the latter state. The Maryland and New York cases above mere-
ly succeed in surprising the litigants who find themselves bound
by decrees respecting matters with which the decrees do not pur-
port to deal.6"
A DECREE FOR ALIMONY AFTER A VALID Ex PARTE DIVORCE
We have seen that a state without violating full faith and credit
63. Marshall v. Marshall, 280 App. Div. 814, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 602 (1952).
64. Id. at 815, 113 N. Y. S. 2d at 604. The Florida decree contained the
following reservation: ... . a decree of absolute divorce in an action instituted
by the husband (plaintiff herein) was entered in the Circuit Court of Dade
County, Florida. That decree contains the following provisions: 'Ordered,
adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff herein be, and he is hereby, required,
until the further Order of this Court, to pay to the defendant, for her sup-
port and maintenance and that of the infant child of the parties, Lloyd Thayer
Marshall, the sum of Forty Five ($45.00) Dollars each week, in accordance
with the terms of that certain Judgment of the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, County of Nassau, wherein Lloyd Burton Marshall was plain-
tiff and Helen Marshall was defendant, said Judgment being entered on June
30, 1948, and recorded in the Court House, Mineola, Nassau County, New
York, in Liber 228 at page 231 of Judgments being Case No. 445148; and
further, the defendant is required to perform, abide by and carry out the
Orders, terms, and conditions of said Judgment with respect to the custody
of said infant child. This Court hereby expressly retains jurisdiction of this
cause for the purpose of making such other and further appropriate Orders
with respect to alimony and the support, maintenance, care, custody and
control of the infant child, Lloyd Thayer Marshall, as may properly come
before this Court'."
65. Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 1949), shows
how considerable the surprise element can be. There a husband's ex parte
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may continue to enforce a support order after a valid ex parte
divorce. May a state grant a decree of alimony for the first time
after a divorce? If the state granting the divorce forbids granting
post-divorce alimony a full faith and credit question arises.
The Supreme Court's Estin66 case does not dispose of the mat-
ter.67 In EsthL the decision rested in part on the fact that a support
order was outstanding at the time of the husband's ex parte divorce
and so could be characterized as a "property right" which could
not be taken away by force of a foreign ex parte decree. Of course,
rights to support undefined by decree can be labeled "property" but
certainly with greater difficulty."
Moreover, the 1913 opinion, Thompson v. Thompson,"9 stands
in the path of the complete acceptance of the "divisible divorce"
concept. There a wife sought a separate maintenance decree in the
District of Columbia but before the decree was entered the hus-
band obtained an ex parte decree of divorce a inensa et thoro in
Virginia, the matrimonial domicil. Under Virginia law the decree
foreclosed any right of the wife to receive alimony or maintenance.
The Supreme Court therefore held that the Virginia decree, by
operation of the full faith and credit statute, barred the wife's Dis-
trict of Columbia action.
It would be most unfortunate if the Supreme Court should
merely permit the wife's domicil to protect her rights under an
existing support order and to forbid protection of support rights
generally after a valid ex parte divorce. It is the whole problem of
support, not merely a wife's rights under a present order which
Florida decree provided for payment of alimony. Because the wife attempted
to enforce that obligation by contempt proceedings in Florida, the New York
court held that she had appeared in the Florida proceedings and therefore
had lost her rights under a prior New York support order.
66. Estin v. Estin, 324 U. S. 541 (1948).
(,7. Esthn has been treated as completely disposing of the problem
raised. Professor J. H. C. Morris in discussing the scope of Estin said, ".... it
would appear immaterial whether or not the wife's right to support has or has
not crystallized in a support order, since in either case the economic prob-
lms is the same and should receive the same solution." Morris, Divisible
Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287, 1302-1303 (1951). See also Meredith v.
M eredith, 204 F. 2d 64, 66 n. 3 (1953) : "While the Estin decision involved
merely the enforcement of a maintenance order entered prior to the foreign
divorce, its reasoning would seem to be equally applicable to an original
grant of maintenance after a divorce. Either may be done consistently with
the full faith and credit clause."
68. But see the statement in Johnson v. Johnson, 119 Colo. 551, 555, 206
P. 2d 597, 599 (1949) : "The Nevada decree proceeded as an action in rem
and when given effect by the courts of this state, it is only as to the marital
status and not as a decree effective on the question of the right of the plaintiff
being able to follow her inchoate interest in the property of her husband to
the extent of her necessary support."
69. 226 U. S. 551 (1913).
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requires separate treatment. The economic disaster caused by a
runaway husband is equally serious in either case to the wife who is
abandoned.
In his Estin opinion Mr. Justice Douglas distinguished the
Thompson case: "This case is unlike Thompson v. Thompson ...
where the wife by her conduct forfeited her right to alimony under
the laws of the state of the matrimonial domicile where her hus-
band obtained the divorce, and hence could not retain a judgment
for maintenance subsequently obtained in another jurisdiction. 7 0
This distinction limits the ex parte decrees which cut off alimony
rights to the orders of the state in which the parties last lived as
husband and wife and, of those, only to the ones which cut alimony
rights because of the wife's misconduct. In this light Thompson
would apply to few divorces indeed. However, even within this
narrow scope, the federal law should not foreclose states from
dealing with support matters after an out-of-state divorce decree
obtained by one party alone. If there is merit in dealing with sup-
port questions separately as a general matter, there is equal merit
in the separation even in this narrow area. The economic need, the
moral and legal claims for alimony can be adequately and fairly
explored only in a proceeding involving both parties.
Other ways for dealing with Thompson are not hard to find.
Certainly the opinion can be overruled; be read as a 1913 essay,
drained of vitality by the modem post-Williams cases. Moreover,
if some of its language is ignored, the decision can be regarded
as merely a conflict of laws case for the District of Columbia decided
by the highest court for the District.
Upon the assumption that Thompson either will be reduced to
insignificance or will be overruled, the problem of getting alimony
after foreign divorce becomes a problem of the law of the state
in which the suit is brought.
In some states the plaintiff is confronted at the outset with a
problem of finding an available remedy. The jurisdiction of courts
to grant alimony may exist only as an incident to a divorce pro-
ceeding. For example, Dimon v. Dimon,7 1 a recent California case
commented about the statutes authorizing alimony in California.
"The language of these sections shows a consistent legisla-
tive purpose to confine the powers of the court to decree sup-
port in any form to the period when actions for divorce, annul-
ment and separate maintenance are pending, including time on
appeal and such further time as may be within the scope of the
70. Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 546 n. 4 (1948).
71. 40 Cal. 2d 516, 254 P. 2d 528 (1953).
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decree in the particular action. ' '72
If the wife should not seek alimony but a decree of separate
maintenance she may find that statutes authorize such relief only
between parties who are married. When a claim for maintenance
was made in the District of Columbia after a foreign divorce, Judge
Clark of the Court of Appeals for the District wrote:
"This action was brought under Section 415 of Title 16 of
the District of Columbia Code. The very language of the statute
limits suits for maintenance to parties who are 'husband' and
'wife.' No interpretation, however liberal, can eliminate those
essential prerequisites.
'73
The central question is whether sound policy permits a wife to
claim support money after an ex parte divorce and, if so, whether
the existing legal materials dealing with the merits recognize the
wife's claim. It is unfortunate that in any case the matter should
turn on arguments about the jurisdiction of courts.
In Dinion v. Dinzon the plaintiff sought to avoid the line of Cali-
fornia cases which clearly blocked an award of alimony in an in-
dependent action by asking for equitable relief rather than statutory
alimony. She argued that the courts of equity possessed powers to
enforce a husband's support duties apart from the provisions of
statute.
Although Mrs. Dimon failed to persuade the California court,
recognition of an inherent equitable power to award support re-
mains the simplest technique employing case law to provide a
remedy. No compelling reason exists for holding that the statutory
provisions for alimony are exclusive. In some places equitable
power has been recognized in respect to matters of alimony and of
family support. 74 The exercise of this power is within the spirit of
the ancient tradition of equity to find a remedy when a right is given
no adequate protection. Mrs. Dimon's position is supported by the
not uncommon state constitutional provisions requiring a remedy
for every injury.75 Finally, of course, the reasons for recognizing a
72. Id. at 520, 254 P. 2d at 529.
73. Meredith v. Meredith, 204 F. 2d 64, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Lowry
v. Lowry, 256 P. 2d 869, 871 (Kan. 1953), indicates that the Kansas statutes
do not permit an award of separate maintenance after a valid ex parte divorce.
74. Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 172 S. E. 252 (1934) ; ".... quite
apart from any statute, equity will provide a remedy for a violation of the
duty of a husband or father to support and maintain his wife or minor chil-
dren. Such duty has been enforced in this jurisdiction . . .", Meredith v.
Meredith, 204 F. 2d 64, 67 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
75. E.g., ". . . every man shall have remedy by due course of law for
injury done him in person, prospect or reputation." Ore. Const. Art. I, § 10.
A general statute might also be helpful, e.g., Cal. Civil Code, § 1429, ..... an
obligation arising from operation of law may be enforced in the manner pro-
sided by law, or by civil action, or proceeding."
19541
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claim for alimony after ex parte divorces are reasons as well for
discovering a remedy by which to establish the claim.
The jurisdiction of courts to award alimony after an ex parte
divorce has been clearly established by statute in a few states. The
New York act was passed in 1953 after a considerable tangle. The
three New York courts dealing with family questions had all
found themselves without jurisdiction to compel support after a
valid ex parte decree of a sister state.70 The new act provides:
"In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, or for a
declaration of nullity of a void marriage, where the court re-
fuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by the court that
a divorce, annulment or judgment declaring the marriage a nulli-
ty had previously been granted to the husband in an action in
which jurisdiction over the person of the wife was not obtained,
the court may, nevertheless, render in the same action such
judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the
wife." 7
7
In New Jersey, a similar statute labels the wife's award "ali-
mony" and expressly refers to out-of-state divorces.
"Pending a suit for divorce or nullity, brought in this State
or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce, whether obtained in
this State or elsewhere, the court may make such order touching
the alimony of the wife, and also touching the care, custody,
education and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as
the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall
render fit, reasonable and just. .... ,,7
In states which have adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act a plaintiff who uses that procedure would seem
to have a remedy under it even though that might not be the case
had she begun her action in the forum apart from the act. Section
13 of the 1950 version and Section 20 of the 1952 version of the
Uniform Act are identical.
"If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support,
it may order the defendant.., to furnish support or reimburse-
ment therefor and subject the property of the defendant ... to
such order."7 9
76. Law Revision Comm., Legis. Doc. No. 65 (K) 13 (N.Y. 1953).
This commentary was prepared by Professor William Tucker, Dean of
Cornell University School of Law.
77. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1170-b. For commentaries, see Law Re-
vision Comm., Legis. Doc. No. 65 (K) 13 (N.Y. 1953) and Note, Legislative
Recognition of the Divisible Divorce, 28 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 164 (1953).
78. N. J. Stat Ann. § 2A:34-23 (1952) ; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 40,§ 19 (1951) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-1518 (Corrick 1949) ; Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 208, § 34 (1933); R. I. Gen. Laws c. 416, § 5 (1938). The Rhode
Island statute, although not explicitly authorizing alimony after a divorce, has
been construed to permit it. See Phillips v. Phillips, 39 R. I. 92, 97 Atl. 593(1916).
79. Both versions of the act are set forth in the 1953 supplement to
U. L. A. 9A, 57, 83.
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If a plaintiff ex-wife is not blocked by the difficulty of finding
a remedy, she may still find that no recovery is possible. Some
courts have held that any valid divorce decree is res judicata on
the question of alimony. 0 This argument is scarcely persuasive in
cases where the wife was not before the divorcing court and hence
has not had her day in court on the question of support. Nor if
the wife was plaintiff in the ex parte proceeding should she be
barred by res judicata. No more opportunity was presented to
press her claim for support against her absent husband than in a
case brought ex parte by her husband. It might be urged that if
the wife is plaintiff she has "waived" her right to support."' This
application of "waiver" requires a wife entitled to a divorce (pre-
sumably because of some misconduct of the husband) to choose
between (1) the maintenance of rights of support together with a
distressing marriage relationship, or (2) a divorce with consequent
loss of support. It is not easy to see the value of putting such a
choice to anyone.
If a court agrees that neither by res judicata nor by waiver
has a wife in these circumstances lost her right to support, the
forum must face the question by what law shall the plaintiff's right
be determined. Should the law of the forum be applied in every
case, the wife's right and the husband's obligation will depend upon
the accident of the place of trial. The law of the wife's domicil at
the time of the divorce is perhaps the most suitable measure of
a wife's interests. If such a choice of law rule were used, the husband
in most cases will know by what state's law he can expect to be
judged. Neither his obligation nor his right will then depend upon
the future movements of him or his wife.s 2
As a matter of fact almost all the decided cases proceed on the
assumption that the forum's law is to be used. In the proceedings
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1950
version) s3 the duties of support enforced are those "imposed or im-
80. Doeksen v. Doeksen, 202 Iowa 489, 210 N. W. 545 (1926).
81. E.g., Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 At. 605 (1936), 50 Harv. L.
Riv. 526 (1937).
82. See Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287, 1301-1303
(1951).
83. U. L. A. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act § 7 (1950). States
adopting this act are listed in the 1953 Supplement at 49. Texas has added to
the provision: ". . . but shall not include alimony to a former wife." Tex. Stat.,
Rev. Civ. Art. 2328b § 7 (Supp. 1953). The Ohio Supreme Court has refused
to enforce the choice of law section of the 1950 version in a case involving an
attempt to apply the Pennsylvania law respecting support of parents in Ohio.
Under Ohio law the parents have no rights to support in certain circum-
stances. The parent in question was domiciled in Pennsylvania. The Court
held that to subject the Ohio son to Pennsylvania liability would deprive him
19541
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possible under the laws of any state where the alleged obligor was
present during the period for which support is sought or where
the obligee was present when the failure to support commenced at
the election of the obligee." The 1952 revision of the Uniform Act
changed this section to limit choice of law to states in which the
obligor was present during the period for which support is claimed.14
When reference is made to the internal law of the appropriate
state that state may, in addition to possible res judicata and waiver
difficulties, refuse to grant post-divorce support on the simple
ground that there is no longer a legal basis for an award.si The
marriage is dissolved and therefore there is no ground for alimony.
It is at this point that an analysis which distinguishes between the
various incidents of marriage-the concept of "divisible divorce7-
becomes relevant. It is surely too late in the day to argue that a
marriage is a marriage and that one is either married or divorced.
The judge and lawyer of today stops at Halfway House without
great anxiety. Again the important problem is the question of
policy. It has become easy to get ex parte divorces on very liberal
grounds. With modern transportation conveniences a husband can
move quickly away from his responsibilities.
"If the wife's right to support does not survive such an ex
parte decree, she is compelled to protect that right indirectly by
making a collateral attack on the decree. There is no reason to
drive here to such a cumbersome and perhaps futile extreme.
The policy considerations that require recognition of the foreign
decree are not present when the question is the right to support.
Since the courts have evolved rules of law that allow the husband
readily to obtain a divorce, corresponding rules of law must be
invoked to protect the wife and prevent injustice. Accordingly,
we should give effect to an ex parte foreign decree obtained by
the husband insofar as it affects marital status, but declare it
ineffective on the issue of alimony, thus accommodating the
interests of each state by restricting it to matters of her dominant
concern."
8 6
of equal protection of the laws because all other Ohio citizens are free from
responsibility in similar circumstances. Commonwealth v. Mong, 117 N. E. 2d
32 (Ohio, 1954). This approach to the constitutional question would seem to
require the choice 'of the obligor's domiciliary law in support cases.
84. U. L. A. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act § 7 (1952). States
adopting this act are listed in the 1953 Supplement at 83. Maryland expressly
limits the enforcement of duties of support to those ". . . imposed or im-
possible under the laws of Maryland.. .. " Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws, Art.
89C, § 7 (1951).
85. E.g., Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Cal. 2d 762, 68 P. 2d 351 (1937);
Holdorf v. Holdorf, 198 Iowa 158, 197 N. W. 910 (1924).
86. Judge Traynor, dissenting in Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal. 2d 516, 539-
540, 254 P. 2d 528, 541 (1953). Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950),
is a rather extravagant opinion but does contain some argument in support
of granting alimony after divorce.
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Many efforts have been made recently to devise legal means for
enforcing support obligations across state lines. Another easy-to-
forge tool lies at hand-the recognition in more than a few states,87
that a wife may assert a claim for support in an independent pro-
ceeding and without regard to the fact that an ex parte divorce has
already given her the capacity to remarry.8
87. Alimony after a valid ex parte divorce is permitted in, e.g., Taylor
v. Taylor, 242 S. W. 2d 747 (Ky. 1951) ; Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn. 385,
168 N. W. 133 (1918); Melnyk v. Menyk, 49 Ohio Ops. 22, 107 N. E. 2d
549 (1952) ; Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 14 N. W. 33 (1882). The cases are
collected in Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1180 (1940) ; 34 Ky. L. J. 149 (1946), and
Note, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1396 (1953).
88. The husband who must pay the alimony awarded in an independent
proceeding after an ex parte divorce in another state may not be permitted
to deduct these alimony payments under the federal income tax law. Deductible
payments are those ".., imposed... or incurred... under such decree...1
or a ". . . written instrument incident to such divorce. . . ." 26 U. S. C. § 22(K)
(1946). If the first phrase refers to the decree of divorce, alimony granted at
a later time is not imposed or incurred by that decree and hence would not
be deductible. It may be possible to read the first phrase as not limiting the
deduction to payments made under a particular decree and therefore 22(K)
can be read to permit the deduction of all payments made under any legal
compulsion after divorce. See Warren and Surrey, Federal Income Taxation
-Cases and Materials 845-846 Note C (1953 ed.). The second phrase re-
ferring to a "written instrument" probably is directly exclusive to a sepa-
ration agreement and not to a court order. The American Law Institute,
Federal Income Tax Statute, Feb. 1954 Draft, Vol. 1, p. 51, in section 127
would resolve the difficulty by giving a deduction for payments under obliga-
tions imposed "because of marital or family relationship."
